Archive for February, 2012

Political system for Libya

4 February 2012

…work in progress…

Here there are some notes about Libyan Constitutional Assembly and bodies, and about subjects (mainly about just general institutional questions) it should address. The first part has already addressed by the Libyan NTC with an Italian Mattarellum[link in Italian]-like assembly (i.e. part of the assembly elected on a proportional basis, the rest with a majoritarian poll per districts).

Its outlines suit to everywhere, and are a synthesis of a more extended work in progress I am, and whoever else would join it, preparing for publication.

Its core is a parliamentary (with a basically proportional repartition of seats) system of government, and a self-governed magistrature in a Civil Law legal system with judges and prosecutors enlisted in one career whom being able of to choose and, at different times, switch on either one or the other function.

Other elements are a sort of British House of Lords and an Ancient Athenians Boule, declined to contemporary times, the former with some a procedure not to overwhelm that and to fence that under a lot of aspects (including the chamber not being mandatory to enact, but just when it comes in to reach a certain number of members) – read below.

Furthermore, including art. 11 of Italian constitution and the refusal of abortion; electoral law a constitutional law, in the Italian legal language sense of the term, being that a core institutional provision; quotas in the representative chamber for women and young and aged people; and other points of thumb.

First: The Constituent Assembly and Constituency bodies

Constituent Assembly should be a 50-seat pure proportionally elected by people from 14-years-old ones (the age at which a person can get a job) not on blocked list assembly, with a 50% of women and a proportional-to-populace composition for young, not young and aged (read Appendix 2) people – however every age range should not be 50% men-50% women but all the assembly – every list having that composition – in the same way – encompassed for young people by 18/22-years-old candidates (a 5-years range starting from the age of majority) and for aged people, by 56/60-years-old candidates (no candidature to any elective charge being possible over 60-years-old), on a single national electoral district with a 5-year mandate after which electing again the assembly if it does not reach a conclusive resolution.

The assembly should also elect a constituency president – after establishing a duration of the mandate for that charge longer than 5 years – with a qualified majority of 2/3, not to be elected again to presidency, and appoint a government in a parliamentary system of government.

Voters should have to be able to point a maximum of three candidates (at least of age) of the chosen list, if more than one, at least one of a different sex of the other(s).

The conclusive resolution of the assembly should be approved by a confirmative referendum. If not, the assembly remains in charge to address government questions until a new assembly is suddenly elected, ended or not its 5 years of mandate.

Second: Constitution should address:

  • a rigid process to be changed (like the Italian one) by ordinary parliament AND the possibility of electing an assembly-to-the-purpose identical to the Constituent one, which candidatures to are incompatible to other high state charges, with a 5-year mandate, to be re-elected if it does not reach during its mandate a conclusive resolution to in end (read Appendix 3) be voted by a people confirmative referendum.
  • a parliamentary system of government, with a three-chambers parliament: one with 50 representatives at least of age, not electable for more than three consecutive mandates complete or not and a composition like the Constituent Assembly, with a 10-years mandate, elected on one single national electoral district with a seat repartition system with a majority bonus of 55% on preliminary coalitions of not-blocked lists, and a vote system identical to the Constitutional Assembly one providing also to be able to vote just for a coalition; one, with the only power of amending the laws debated by the representative chamber, elected one member per time for life with at least a qualified majority of 2/3 by the representative chamber (read Appendix 1) AND former Presidents of Libya; one with 50 members with a 2-years mandate drawn from a single national list of appliers for, with the power of failing with a qualified majority of 2/3 the laws elaborated by the other two chambers, but some sort of, the same not subject to abrogative referendum, suddenly when they pass them without it amends them. Electoral law for the representative chamber is a “constitutional” one, in the sense of the term in the Italian legal language. No candidature either to those or to every other elective charges possible over 55-years-old, nor to the drawn chamber. Every member of parliament has the same prerogatives of proposing laws and amendments and of immunity.
  • just the representatives’ one vote votes-of-no-confidence for the government.
  • all together in a single assembly, the three chambers elect, for a mandate longer than the representatives’ chamber one ceasing however at their 70 years, two Presidents of Libya, one a female one and one a male one,  under 56 years-old, both acting collegiately (if two Presidents are not in charge, as President acts either the president of the chamber elected by the representatives’ chamber or the president of the representatives’ chamber – read Appendix 1), but with different mandate periods, each one with a qualified majority of 2/3; if the election of one of the Presidents occurs during the year next the election of the other one, that President gets a half mandate, to keep what above.
  • a High Council of the Bench, of no more than 50 members, for the self-government of the Bench, voted by all the Bench pure proportionally on not-blocked lists on one single national district.
  • a Civil Law legal system, with a code of laws to elaborate suddenly by the chambers.
  • Judges-Prosecutors being both two not distinct functions of the Bench, responding to the High Council of the Bench, being able at different times to choose which function to encompass. Mandatory legal action by prosecutors.
  • A High Court appointed for 2/5 collegiately by the Presidents of Libya, 2/5 by High Council of the Bench, 1/5 by the chamber elected by the representatives’ one, with the task of pointing out the constitutionality of laws and central and local government and the Bench provisions, addressing conflicts among state bodies, disposing of immunity for members of chambers.
  • higher state charges incompatibility but among representatives and directional government charges (prime minister, prime minister’s deputies, ministers, ministers’ deputies, undersecretaries).
  • administrative districts – encompassing at the basilar rank no less than 50 thousands and no more, but the metropolitan areas in a single one, than 200 thousands people (areas to redifine at every census if the populace lessens or exceeds the 50-200 thousands people range or with modifying of metropolitan areas) – political bodies identical to these of the Italian provinces, with the elective council (with no more than 50 members – voters can point a double candidature picking two candidates from the picked list, one of a female one and one of a male one) – and lists candidated to that with repartition and appointment similar to that of the representative chamber – female and male and young/not young/aged quotas (proportional to the district age composition – read also Appendix 2), 2/3 majority bonus. They can federate among them and in more than one federation, the same for the federations, with political direction bodies elected and appointed identically to the basical ones.
  • improved administrative autonomy for Berbers, Blacks, Tuaregs, etc.
  • an abrogative referendum system.
  • a parties financing system identical to the German one.
  • representative chamber’s and its committees’ presidencies to the parties without majority bonus.
  • Italian Constitution’s Art. 11; refusal of abortion; Italian “Workers’ Statute” [link in Italian] Art. 18 and a CCNL [link in Italian] (Work National Collective Contracts) procedure similar to the Italian one.
  • Presidents of Libya in charge collegiate commanders-in-chief of Libyan Army.
  • secret services managed and responding to a representatives’ committee with some member of the chamber elected by the representatives’ one, which members incompatible with their chamber’s office of presidency, occasionally other committees and other directional government charges (prime minister, prime minister’s deputies, ministers, ministers’ deputies, undersecretaries).


  1. Candidatures to the chamber elected by the representatives’ chamber should be proposed with the same requirements needed to propose a law, and not during the six months before the voting; the voting should occur no more often than one other year, and the week before voting every candidate should be able to refuse the candidature. Every candidate should be voted, passing the one with more votes but at least a qualified majority of 2/3; if there is evenness, the older person takes the charge. Candidates that does not pass, also when no candidate passes, cannot be candidate again before 10 years pass. The chamber elected by the representatives’ chamber enacts when it reaches at least 15 members; elected ones hold the charge, with the related allowances and every prerogative of a member of parliament, the right to vote for the Presidents of Libya, the restrictions to assume other charges, else their charge is ineffective.
  2. For representatives’ chamber, the assemblies-to-modify-constitution eventually indicted and the lists of candidates to these, the ranges young/not young/aged people which they are reparted on occur so: young are everyone from birth to the fifth year above the age of majority; aged are everyone over 56-years-old (read First section); not young everyone between these two thresholds.
  3. Just after an examination by the Presidents of Libya which they after can exert a one-shot power to send back that to be debated, the conclusive resolution of an assemblies-for-constitution series – as in the point above outlined – pass straightly to be voted by the drawn assembly without it amends that, and if it fails that, the confirmative referendum does not occur, being the same the assemblies-for-constitution series’ work ended.